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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






HAKIM ALI BRYANT, 




CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA POLICE OFFICER HOOVER  #9215; 
POLICE OFFICER JOSEPH COONEY; 
POLICE OFFICER MANUS CASSIDY; 
POLICE OFFICER INOCENCIO AMARO; 
POLICE OFFICER CYPRIAN SCOTT; 
POLICE OFFICER SEAN LEATHERBURY; 
POLICE OFFICER ERIK BULLOCK; 
POLICE OFFICER TODD LEWIS; 
POLICE OFFICER WILLIAM MCDONALD; 
POLICE OFFICER ROBERT DIBIASIO; 
SGT. JOSEPH MCDONALD; 
SGT. AUSTIN FRASER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-10-cv-06111) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 5, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 












 Hakim Ali Bryant commenced a pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the 
District Court, naming as defendants the City of Philadelphia, Detective Hope Hoover, 
and members of a police SWAT team.  Bryant’s complaint asserted claims under the 
First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging that his civil rights 
were violated during the SWAT team’s execution of a search warrant at his house.  The 
District Court granted summary judgment as to several defendants and claims, preserving 
for trial only Bryant’s Fourth Amendment claims against three members of the SWAT 
team: Officer Sean Leatherberry, Officer Erik Bullock, and Sergeant Austin Fraser 
(collectively “Defendants”).1  The District Court liberally construed Bryant’s pro se 
complaint to allege that Defendants were liable for unlawful seizure, false arrest, 
excessive force, and failure to intervene.2
                                              
1 The District Court granted summary judgment to the City of Philadelphia, Detective 
Hoover, and the remaining members of the SWAT team on all claims, and to Defendants 
Leatherberry, Bullock, and Fraser on Bryant’s claims under the First, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Bryant’s appellate brief does not challenge the award of 
summary judgment and we do not consider it here.  See Laborers' Int'l Union v. Foster 
Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[a]n issue is waived unless a party 
raises it in its opening brief”). 
  Following a bench trial on those claims, the 
Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants.  Bryant timely filed this pro se appeal. 
2 Prior to trial, the District Court held a pretrial conference in which it gave Bryant 30 
days to consult with at least three attorneys to inquire whether they would represent him.  
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We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the 
District Court’s findings of fact for clear error, and exercise plenary review over its 
conclusions of law.  See Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 514-515 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
 In 2010, Detective Hope Hoover, accompanied by a SWAT team, executed a 
warrant to search 1945 Sigel Street in Philadelphia for evidence relating to a complaint 
against Bryant’s brother, Sakoue Armour, for aggravated assault, child endangerment, 
and weapons violations.  The only people inside the house at the time of the warrant’s 
execution were Bryant and his mother, Janet Armour.  After observing a SWAT team 
outside the house, Janet Armour yelled upstairs to Bryant that the police were outside.  
She then complied with the officers’ instructions to open the door.  At that point, an 
officer pointed a large weapon at her head and instructed her to sit down in the living 
room.  As the SWAT team entered the home, one group of officers proceeded downstairs 
into the cellar, while another group, which included Defendants Leatherberry, Bullock, 
and Fraser, ascended the stairs to the second floor where they encountered Bryant exiting 
a bedroom.  Defendant Bullock immediately grabbed Bryant and passed him to 
Defendant Leatherberry, who instructed Bryant to lie on the ground. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Bryant later informed the District Court that he was unable to retain counsel, and the 
District Court thereafter scheduled a non-jury trial in accordance with Bryant’s request. 
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 At this point, the versions of events offered by Bryant and Defendants at trial 
diverged.  Bryant testified that, once on the floor, he was “jumped on” and felt sharp 
pains in his back from what he believed to be a “knee or a kick.”3  He stated that he was 
then handcuffed and raised from the ground, at which time he protested that he was being 
illegally seized, and one of the Defendants responded “oh, we got a lawyer up here.”  
According to Bryant, he was detained in the upstairs hallway for “at least 45 minutes to 
an hour” before being brought downstairs.  Defendants’ testimony, on the other hand, 
indicated that Bryant was briefly secured in order to protect their safety while clearing the 
upstairs floor, but each officer denied that anyone stepped on or kicked Bryant’s back.  
Defendant Leatherberry explained that Bryant was asking them questions about why he 
was being detained and that Bryant “wasn’t combative, but he wasn’t compliant either.”  
Defendants testified that Sergeant Fraser remained with Bryant while Officers 
Leatherberry and Bullock continued to search the second floor for other individuals and 
weapons.  Defendants further testified that once the first and second floors were cleared, 
Bryant was brought downstairs to the living room and, after it was determined that he 
was not the individual targeted by the warrant, he was released from handcuffs.4
                                              
3  Bryant testified that as a result of this incident he sustained injuries to his lower back 
that required medical treatment, and that he went to the emergency room that night and 
later followed up with his primary care doctor.  He did not submit documentation to 
support those claims.  The only medical records submitted to the District Court were 
from a physical therapist, dated between ten days and six weeks from the incident. 
 
4 Janet Armour testified that after Bryant was brought downstairs, his handcuffs were 
removed and he was allowed to sit next to her on the couch unrestrained.  Bryant testified 
that he was in handcuffs until the SWAT team left some time later. 
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Bryant testified that the SWAT team was in the house for approximately an hour 
and ten minutes.  Janet Armour also testified that the officers were in the house for “over 
an hour.”  Detective Hoover and Defendants testified that the search took a total of 
between 15 and 30 minutes and that no weapons were recovered or arrests made.  Prior to 
departing, Detective Hoover provided Janet Armour with a copy of the search warrant. 
 Following the bench trial, the District Court issued a memorandum setting forth its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).  The Court explained 
that it found Defendants’ version of the facts more persuasive than Bryant’s, noting that 
Bryant “was evasive and hostile in his answers during cross-examination, whereas 
[Defendants] were consistent in the sequence of events which occurred as they secured 
the second floor.”  The Court found that Bryant was briefly handcuffed and detained 
while the officers completed their search of the second floor, but that there was “no 
evidence, aside from [Bryant]’s evasive testimony,” that any of the Defendants jumped 
on, kicked, or kneed Bryant’s back.  The Court further found that the search took a total 
of no more than 30 minutes to complete and that once Defendants determined that Bryant 
was not Sakoue Armour, he was released from handcuffs.  After setting forth these 
findings of fact, the Court concluded that, as a matter of law, Bryant could not succeed on 
his Fourth Amendment claims of unlawful seizure, false arrest, excessive force, or his 






Bryant argues that the District Court’s findings of fact were prejudicial and 
erroneous, asserting that the evidence he presented at trial “was more believable than 
Defendants’ case” because Defendants offered inconsistent testimony with respect to 
whether the officers possessed photographs of Sakoue Armour; whether any of the 
Defendants pointed a weapon at Bryant; and which of the Defendants continued the 
search of the second floor while Bryant was detained.  He specifically focuses on alleged 
inconsistencies between the videotaped deposition of Defendant Bullock, which was 
recorded for use at trial, and the live testimony of Defendants Leatherberry and Fraser. 
In reviewing the District Court’s findings of fact for clear error, we “must give due 
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
52(a)(6).  Our review of the District Court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous 
standard is even more deferential with respect to credibility determinations.  See United 
States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 440-41 (3d Cir. 1997).  Our review of the trial record in 
this case convinces us that the District Court’s factual findings were not clearly 
erroneous.  The Court’s determination that Defendants’ testimony was more credible than 
Bryant’s is bolstered by the SWAT Unit Service Report, which corroborates Defendants’ 
testimony about the length of the search, and also by Bryant’s failure to provide 
documentation of receiving emergency room and primary care for back injuries.  Our 
7 
 
review of the trial transcript convinces us that the alleged inconsistencies Bryant observes 
in Defendants’ testimony are generally not supported by the record.5
Having determined that the District Court’s findings of fact were not clearly 
erroneous, we agree with the District Court that Bryant’s Fourth Amendment claims 
cannot succeed as a matter of law.  Bryant cannot succeed on an unlawful seizure claim 
because Defendants detained him for a short length of time and in a reasonable manner 
pursuant to executing a valid high-risk search warrant in the house he was occupying.  
See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701-03 (1981); Torres v. United States, 200 
F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1999).  Similarly, Bryant’s false arrest claim fails because the 
circumstances of his detention did not constitute an arrest.  See Summers, 452 U.S. at 
699; Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1192 (3d Cir. 1995).  Those circumstances 
also do not suggest that Defendants unreasonably applied force to protect their personal 
safety.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989); Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 
199, 206-07 (3d Cir. 2007).  In the absence of demonstrating that any of the Defendants 
engaged in excessive force or committed another constitutional violation, Bryant also 
cannot succeed on a claim of failure to intervene.  See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 
650-51 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
                                              
5 To the extent Bryant argues that the District Court’s decision to allow Bullock’s video-
taped deposition to substitute for his live testimony deprived him of a fair trial, his 
argument fails not only because he agreed to the procedure in writing, but also because he 
was present at the video-taping and had the opportunity to cross-examine Bullock. 
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Finally, Bryant argues that he did not receive a fair trial and that the District Court 
showed prejudice against him because the Court took no remedial action after he 
informed the judge during trial that the Defendants’ counsel “answered interrogatories in 
this case . . . on behalf of the Defendants and without their approval which Plaintiff could 
not really cross-examine.”  Bryant provides no further explanation for this assertion, nor 
does he explain why he was unable to cross-examine Defendants about the interrogatory 
answers during trial.  In any event, we find no support for this claim in the trial record. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
